DOMINIC SCOTT PLATO MENO PDF
Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s m Wians – – Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society (Plato 12 ()). Dominic Scott has produced a monograph on the Meno that in its fluency and succinctness does justice to its subject and, like its subject. Buy [(Plato’s Meno)] [Author: Dominic Scott] published on (March, ) by Dominic Scott (ISBN:) from Amazon’s Book Store. Everyday low prices and free.
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On both the strategic and the more detailed level, Scott presents his readings of the dialogue, and in the main his reasons for adopting them, with a lucidity and focus that makes it easy to raise questions.
Let us look at the four cases that Scott identifies as involving Socrates being put on trial. Grube – – New York: Finally, the introductory chapter takes up the question of whether the Meno is “the” transitional dialogue.
In any event, the fact that Socrates makes “use of the term ‘erisitc’ to describe the dilemma” scot does not, without begging the question of Meno’s character, imply that Meno’s own “motives for using the argument are bad” ibid. Meno remains the same bully now as before, and Socrates in effect warns us not to be taken in by ddominic current turn to politeness dominnic collegiality.
Scott so inflates what is involved in “following a plat that it becomes comparable for him to how people discover “new geometrical proofs that no one had ever taught them” In the light of this, it is slightly perverse to claim that sctot mentioning the possibility that the questioner is ‘erisitc'” Socrates is imputing that failing to Meno Such an approach requires us to make a rather sharp distinction between Meno’s character and that of at least some of Plato’s readership.
If, however, the determination of what is philosophical begins with Socrates, with the life of inquiry and examination that he led, a life animated by questions and conducted through dialogue, can we be sure that philosophy excludes the employment of intentionally flawed arguments?
R. Dancy, Dominic Scott, Plato’s Meno – PhilPapers
What Socrates actually says is that the argument logos is eristic, not that Meno is: The Meno of Plato R. Request removal from index. First, there is the xcott of Meno; and second, what Scott labels as “Socrates on trial” — the claim that in a number of important instances Socratic positions are subject to challenge by Meno, domniic that Socrates is thereby compelled to offer an explicit philosophical defense for theses that may previously have had the status of undefended assumptions.
The root vominic the problem is, again, Scott’s strategy of attempting to read the dialogue as operating on two levels. On several issues, he strikes out boldly on his own.
Moreover, the numbing effect need not be paralyzing: Second, Socrates in the Meno seeks no more than the virtue common to all human beings–he surely would not hold that the virtue of, say, a knife, involves justice and temperance. With respect to 2it is certainly possible that Plato is troubled by the way in which Socratic examination tends to result in stand-offs between Socrates and his interlocutors.
Even with the second feature we have rather a mixed bag. Cambridge University PressFeb 16, – Philosophy. sott
Dominic Scott: Plato’s Meno.
For Socrates, even that good that is most widely agreed to be his ultimate good, happiness, is nevertheless “profitable”: No keywords specified fix it. This supposedly demonstrates his “obtuseness” ibid. The fact platoo that Meno was never opposed to learning from others: It is no straightforward exercise to extract the views of the historical Socrates from the Platonic dramatizations and fictionalizations of Socratic conversations.
Bluck – – Journal of Hellenic Studies Scott offers an interesting analysis of why Anytus is introduced into the dialogue, suggesting that Anytus represents a more extreme or exaggerated version of Meno’s character, and that Socrates uses him to alert Meno to the dangers of continuing on the trajectory of antipathy to inquiry.
Most notably, he dares to specify the views of the historical Socrates and vigorously defends the contention that the Meno predates the Gorgias. He then places himself and Meno firmly in the latter category, and goes on to do exactly what he says he would in cases of that sort.
On Scott’s view, Socrates answers Meno’s challenge by maintaining that whereas inquiry begins with opinions held at the conscious level–that is, with mere opinions that are subject to revision–nevertheless, since inquiry is actually guided by latent knowledge, discovery, too, is possible: Good things, even final goods, are beneficial and profitable.
Meno’s tentativeness suggests mno accurately, I daresay — that the unitarian assumption is no easy thing to evaluate.
But if Plato’s criticism of Socrates amounts to little more than that Socratic inquiry is not always beneficial, that it is at times even counterproductive, it is hardly new to the Meno.
Scott takes a somewhat downbeat view of Meno’s character, though he also suggests that Socrates manages to initiate some limited improvement by the dialogue’s end.
I close with one final problem that I believe bears mentioning, namely, the assimilation of the beneficial to the instrumental. In a new departure, this book’s exploration focuses primarily on the content and coherence of the dialogue in its own right and not merely in the context of other dialogues, making it required reading for all students of Plato, be they from the world of classics or philosophy.
As far as 4 is concerned, might it not be that Socrates insists on the priority of definition because asking for a definition is the best way to elicit the views and commitments of his interlocutors?